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Executive Summary: Problems, Examples and Solutions 
New York State is spending billions of dollars on economic 
development programs without reaping significant public benefits.  
Too often the State is subsidizing sprawl, pollution, and poverty-
level employment.  An examination of the State’s two largest 
economic development programs, the industrial development 
agencies and the New York Power Authority, reveals numerous 
problems – but also ready solutions that will save the taxpayers 
money and lead to real, sustainable growth. 
 
Problem:  Many subsidized projects do not grow the economic 
pie, but merely re-slice it. 
 
Example: Of the thirteen projects aided by the Amherst IDA in 
2010, only two exported goods or services beyond the state.  
The other 11 projects included two supermarkets, one car 
dealership, and three medical offices. 
 
Solution: Explicitly require a certain level of job creation per 
subsidy, and evaluate projects not simply on how many jobs the 
company claims it will create or retain at the project, but on how 
many net jobs the project will add to the state.  Projects such as 
retail stores, hotels, medical offices, and car dealerships may 
add jobs to one company, but only at the expense of other local 
companies.  Focus subsidies on projects that export goods or 
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services beyond the state, and, ideally, the nation.  Require that 
construction jobs created go to local, not out-of-state workers. 
 
 
Problem:  Many subsidized projects subsidize poverty-level jobs 
that leave the workers dependent on public assistance. 
 
Example:  The Niagara County IDA’s current project list includes 
five hotel/motel projects.  The median wage in Western New 
York for a housekeeper, such as a hotel chambermaid, is 
$18,920.  
 
Solution:  Do not subsidize low-wage service sector jobs in retail 
and hospitality.  Require all subsidized companies to pay a living 
wage: i.e. enough so that the worker will not require public 
assistance. 
 
 
Problem:  Economic development programs do not help the 
workers who need them most: those who suffer from 
segregation, discrimination, and other disadvantages.  
 
Example: The State’s IDA law does not include any provisions 
that require or incentivize companies to hire local workers or 
disadvantaged workers. 
 
5 
 
Solution:  Require contractors to have certified apprenticeship 
and pre-apprenticeship programs offering pathways out of 
poverty. 
 
 
Problem:  Economic development programs tend to reward 
sprawl, rather than reinvestment in existing buildings and 
infrastructure. 
 
Example: Of the Niagara County IDA’s seventeen 2010 projects, 
only three are in the City of Niagara Falls, while the prosperous, 
fast-growing town of Wheatfield captures six, including two 
doctor’s offices and one dentist 
 
Solution: Create state-wide criteria that favor projects that re-
use buildings, do not require new infrastructure, and promote 
reinvestment in urban cores. 
 
 
Problem:  IDAs overlap, compete with one another, and give rise 
to expensive and inefficient multiple bureaucracies. 
 
Example:  The Buffalo Niagara region has nine separate IDAs, 
including six in Erie County. 
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Solution: Merge IDAs so that there is only one per economic 
region, or, at most, one per county.  Reduce the nine IDAs in 
Buffalo-Niagara to one or two. 
 
 
Problem:  IDAs are funded with a percentage of the tax 
exemptions they offer, giving them the incentive to offer as 
many and as large exemptions as possible. 
 
Example:  The Amherst IDA granted HSBC $79 million in tax 
breaks to expand a data center, a subsidy worth $6.6 million per 
job created. 
 
Solution: Fund IDAs with a separate funding stream that is not 
contingent on the deals they make. 
 
 
Problem:  Campaign donations by businesses seeking subsidies 
or contracts from IDAs distort the process. 
 
Example: The Harris Beach law firm has given over $60,000 in 
campaign contributions to Erie County Executive Chris Collins 
and $20,000 to the Erie County Republican Party during the 
Collins era.  Collins successfully urged the Erie County IDA to 
hire new attorneys, and Harris Beach was chosen. 
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Solution:  Place stronger limits on the ability of IDAs to give tax 
exemptions or professional contracts to businesses that have 
donated to the campaigns of IDA board members. 
 
 
Problem:  IDA boards are dominated by business interests with a 
pro-subsidy bias. 
 
Example: The seven member board of the Amherst IDA includes 
five members with a clearly corporate orientation, one attorney, 
and one professor.  No members represent workers.   
 
Solution:  State legislation should require that most members of 
an IDA be drawn from citizen groups, non-profits, academic 
institutions, elected bodies, and other representatives of the 
public interest. 
 
 
Problem:  Many IDA and NYPA subsidies are wasted on 
businesses that do not deliver on their promises of jobs and 
other community benefits. 
 
Example: Between 2003 and 2005, 23 companies failed to meet 
their job obligations under NYPA Expansion Power program, but 
only six had their allocation reduced. 
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Solution:  Add clawback provisions to all subsidy programs, 
allowing the government to terminate and reclaim subsidies 
when targets are not met. 
 
 
Problem:  NYPA has violated its legal duty to devote more than 
one third of the power from the Niagara Plant to businesses 
within 30 miles of the Plant. 
 
Example:  As of 2008, one fifth of the low cost power earmarked 
for local businesses had gone unused over the past four years 
and had instead been sold by NYPA for an estimated $161 
million. 
 
Solution: Require NYPA to make up for all the lost subsidies with 
additional allocations to Western New York businesses. 
 
 
Problem:  Under NYPA’s leadership, Western New York sees 
more burdens than benefits from hosting one of the state’s 
greatest assets: the Niagara Power plant. 
 
Example: Residential customers in Erie and Niagara Counties pay 
electric bills at rates 50% higher than the national average – a 
difference that adds up to some $400 per year.   
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Solution:  Require NYPA to devote more of its low-cost power to 
residential and business customers in Western New York. 
 
 
Problem:  NYPA, which should be in the power business, is 
poorly suited to doing economic development and does so in 
isolation from other economic development program, in an often 
ad hoc and politicized manner. 
 
Example:  In 2007, Alcoa reached a deal with the State for $5.6 
billion in low cost power (one quarter of market rate) over 30 
years, in exchange for a promise to invest $600 million in its 
Massena facility and not to eliminate more than 165 jobs from its 
work force of 1,065.   
 
Solution: Begin process of moving economic development 
functions to Empire State Development, and prioritizing NYPA’s 
primary mission of providing low-cost power for all New York 
residents and businesses. 
 
 
Problem: Project-specific subsidies like those offered by NYPA 
and the IDAs are highly inefficient and waste tax revenues that 
could be spent on traditional public goods such as infrastructure, 
health, and education – which have the additional benefit of 
creating more jobs. 
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Example:  New York’s tax expenditures on business have risen to 
$8.2 billion per year, even as the State is slashing spending on 
almost every other program. 
 
Solution: Reduce business subsidies and use the revenue 
regained on traditional public goods.  
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Introduction: A Big Deal 
This is an important moment for a fresh discussion of New York’s 
economic development policies.  Governor Cuomo has called for 
a new approach and has created ten regional economic 
development councils to craft strategic plans and criteria that will 
help guide roughly $1 billion in State funding.i  The councils also 
have a broad charge to make policy recommendations about 
economic development. 
 
Meanwhile, unemployment and underemployment remain 
stubbornly high, and economic inequality continues to increase, 
as manufacturing jobs are 
replaced by low-wage 
service jobs.  New York 
faces severe budgetary 
challenges and has slashed 
spending in most sectors of 
State government.  Now, 
more than ever, New 
Yorkers need to take a 
close look at the State’s 
spending on economic 
development and the 
results that it is yielding.  
 
Over the last decades, 
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economic development has become an increasingly large and 
expensive part of what state and local governments do.  
Nationally, business incentive programs now cost state and local 
governments some $70 billion dollar per year.ii In his budget 
message, Governor Cuomo noted that spending on economic 
development in New York State had more than tripled over the 
past decade, reaching about $1.55 billion in the fiscal year 
ending in March 2011 – without achieving meaningful success in 
job creation.iii   
 
“Economic development” is a vague term.  But in New York as in 
other states, what economic development programs largely 
amount to is the awarding of tax breaks and other benefits to 
individual businesses.  Governor Cuomo’s figure of $1.55 billion 
was conservative.  When all the State’s tax expenditures on 
business are combined, they now amount to some $8.2 billion 
per yeariv -- and that is just the tax breaks, not including all the 
overhead and staffing costs for all of the agencies that provide 
those tax breaks, and not including the low-cost power allocated 
by the New York Power Authority. 
 
Unfortunately, New Yorkers are receiving very little return for 
their billions of dollars in investment.  Instead, the State has 
created a sprawling, incoherent set of bureaucracies whose main 
function is to give tax breaks to some businesses at the expense 
of other businesses and taxpayers.  This is done largely in the 
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name of job creation, but there is no evidence that the billions of 
dollars are buying many jobs, much less quality jobs that can 
grow and sustain a vibrant economy.   
 
“Economic development” has become an upside down world in 
which, instead of government promoting public goods, 
government is captured by private businesses looking to 
increase their owners’ profits at the public expense. As the 
State’s resources are diverted into private concerns, it is forced 
to shortchange its traditional goals: building infrastructure, 
safeguarding natural resources, and promoting the health, 
education, quality of life, and equal opportunity of the people.  
 
The way that New York runs its economic development programs 
only adds to the waste.  As reported recently by the Alliance for 
a Greater New York (ALIGN), over 20 State agencies perform 
economic development functions and administer programs with 
an economic development mission.  The Empire State 
Development Corporation, the State’s main development entity, 
has some 202 subsidiaries that operate as independent entities 
with a board, president, and staff, each associated with a large-
scale development project.  At the local level, a haphazard web 
of over 500 local development corporations, 115 Industrial 
Development Agencies, 82 Empire Zones Boards, 114 Business 
Improvement Districts, 49 Urban Renewal and Community 
14 
 
Development Agencies and 10 Regional ESDC offices engage in 
economic development activities. 
 
In this report, PPG examines New York’s broken system with 
examples from four of the largest economic development 
programs in the Buffalo Niagara region: the New York Power 
Authority (NYPA); and the industrial development agencies (IDAs) 
for Erie County, Niagara County, and the Town of Amherst.   The 
goal of the report is not just to recommend changes to NYPA and 
the IDAs, but also to draw conclusions that are widely applicable 
to economic development efforts and that can help to guide the 
Regional Economic Development Councils as they craft their 
plans and criteria.  This report is not meant to criticize the 
individuals operating NYPA and the IDAs, but rather to analyze 
the laws and policies under which they are working. 
 
 
Industrial Development Agencies: Erie County, Niagara County, 
and the Town of Amherst 
Industrial Development Agencies, or IDAs, are public benefit 
corporations created by State statute to advance the job 
opportunities, health, general prosperity and economic welfare of 
the people and to improve their recreation opportunities, 
prosperity, and standard of living.  More specifically, they are to 
assist in the acquiring, constructing, reconstructing, improving, 
maintaining, equipping and furnishing of industrial, 
 manufacturing, commer
by providing tax exemptions (real property, sales, and mortgage 
recording) and bonding.
New York now has 115 IDAs in 62 counties.  IDAs have grown 
consistently more active over the decade, doing more projects 
each year.  In 2003 IDAs assisted 3,294 projects with $354 
million in net tax exemptions; by 2009 they assisted 4,577 
projects with $496 in net tax exemptions.
The most powerful tool IDAs have is the property tax exemption, 
which they achieve by taking t
Since the IDA is exempt from property tax, it can then pass the 
savings on to the company.  Typically, the IDA negotiates a 
payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT) from the company to partially 
offset the 
exemption.  Thus, 
in 2009, IDAs 
granted $1.1 billion 
in exemptions but 
offset those with 
$693 in PILOTs, for 
net exemptions 
totaling $496 
million.vii 
 
cial, and certain other types of facilities 
v 
vi   
itle to the company’s property.  
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The tax exemptions 
affect the revenues 
local governments and 
school districts, as well 
as New York State.  For 
example, in 2009, of the 
sales tax exemptions, 
$67.9 million were from 
State sales tax, and 
$48.4 million were from 
local.  Of the property 
tax exemptions, $367.9 
million were from school district taxes, $119.8 were from county, 
and $676.8 were from local.
The loss of tax revenue happens so quietly that citizens have no 
idea it is taking place.  For example, the Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Authority recently announced that it might need 
to increase its fares, due to increased costs and loss of revenue 
from several sources, including a decrease in the Erie County 
money it receives from the mortgage recording tax.  Few if any 
citizens would know that one reason for inadequate revenue 
from the mortgage recording tax is that the Erie County’s six 
IDAs have granted so man
 
of 
viii   
y exemptions from it. 
16 
 Despite their name, Industrial Development Agencies are not at 
all limited to industrial projects.  In fact, in 2009, finance, 
insurance, and real estate projects captured almost 30% of net 
tax exemptions.  Transportation, communicat
and sanitary services projects received 26% of net exemptions.  
Manufacturing received some 15%, and services received some 
11%.  
Another popular misconception about IDAs is that they use their 
incentives to lure businesses from out o
the 71 tax exemption deals that the IDAs of Niagara County, Erie 
County, and the Town of Amherst did in 2010, only one appears 
to involve a company coming from out of state (Triad Recycling).  
All the other deals appear to be exp
companies that were already in the region.
26%
15%
11%
2009 IDA Net Tax Exemptions by Sector
ion, electric, gas, 
f state to the region.  Of 
ansions or relocations by 
 
30%
Finance, Insurance, Real 
Estate
Transportation, 
Communication, Electric, 
Gas & Sanitary
Manufacturing
Services
17 
 
18 
 
Perhaps the most important thing to understand about IDAs is 
how broad and loose their mandate is.  The IDA statute tells 
them to assist “projects,” and it places almost no limits on which 
projects they should assist.  IDA projects are not required to 
produce or retain jobs or to produce any specified public benefits 
or avoid any specified public harms.  The statute does require 
IDAs to establish a uniform tax exemption policy, and it tells 
them in adopting such a policy to “consider” such issues as “the 
extent to which a project will create or retain permanent, private 
sector jobs,” and “the effect of the proposed project upon the 
environment,” but it mandates virtually no criteria or controls.ix 
 
A Bigger Pie, or Different Slices? 
 
The first goal of New York’s economic development policy should 
be to create more quality jobs. To create more jobs, it is 
necessary to increase the size of the economic pie, rather than 
merely re-slicing it among various businesses.  Government 
intervention that simply favors one competitor over another does 
not produce more jobs; it just shifts them from one company to 
another.  In doing so, it wastes government resources and 
distorts the market, since a company is rewarded for its ability 
to get government subsidies, not for its excellence, efficiency, 
and benefit to the public. 
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To see if a project will increase the pie or merely re-slice it, one 
needs to look at the company’s 
competitors and its customers.  
If the company competes 
against companies from other 
countries, then government 
assistance may grow our 
national economy by favoring 
our company over another 
nation’s.  If the company 
competes against companies 
from other states, then 
government intervention might 
grow New York’s economy at 
the expense of other states 
(from a national perspective, 
this would wasteful and 
inefficient, but it might help 
New York).  A similar logic prevails in looking at customers.  If 
the company’s customers are all local, then government 
intervention will tend to be wasteful, but if it exports goods or 
services then intervention may be more productive. 
 
Unfortunately, the law governing IDAs does not require a 
rigorous look at a company’s competitors and customers to 
determine if the project is growing the pie or merely re-slicing it.  
Problem:  Many subsidized 
projects do not grow the 
economic pie, but merely re-slice 
it. 
 
Solution: Explicitly require a 
certain level of job creation per 
subsidy, and evaluate projects 
not simply on how many jobs the 
company claims it will create or 
retain at the project, but on how 
many net jobs the project will 
add to the state.  Projects such 
as retail stores, hotels, medical 
offices, and car dealerships may 
add jobs to one company, but 
only at the expense of other local 
companies.  Focus subsidies on 
projects that export goods or 
services beyond the state, and, 
ideally, the nation.  Require that 
construction jobs created go to 
local, not out-of-state workers. 
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Thus, of the 13 tax break deals that the Amherst IDA did in 2010, 
only two involved businesses that exported goods or services 
beyond the state.x  The Niagara County and Erie County IDA 
assisted more businesses in manufacturing and other export-
oriented work, but the Niagara County IDA gave exemptions for 
a dentistry in Wheatfield and medical offices in Wheatfield, 
Cambria, and Lockport; and the Erie County IDA assisted 
projects such as a Dollar General store, the expansion of a 
restaurant (Chef’s), and an urgent care facility.xi   
 
Another key question is whether the company is locally owned or 
headquartered.  If the company’s owners are local, then more of 
their profits will stay in the local economy as they are spent, 
invested, and donated to local causes.  If the company is 
privately held by owners in another state, or if it is publicly held 
by shareholders from around the world, then the profits will 
produce less local benefit and more benefit in other states and 
nations.  Even if the company is publicly held, it matters where it 
is headquartered, because companies tend to reward their home 
regions with more charitable contributions and civic involvement, 
and, when they make decisions about cutting costs or trimming 
back operations, they tend to cut the branches first and the 
home last. 
 
HSBC Bank, headquartered in Europe, is a good example of 
lavish tax breaks with little local benefit.  In 2006, the Amherst 
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IDA granted HSBC $79 million in tax breaks to expand a data 
center, a subsidy worth $6.6 million per job created.xii  Now 
HSBC is dramatically reducing its Buffalo operations, selling its 
175 upstate retail bank branches, and closing its data center, 
which will be purchased by M&T.  In addition to assuming 
HSBC’s tax breaks, M&T is seeking tax breaks of roughly $8.5 
million over 10 years for new technology and equipment 
purchases for the data center.xiii   
 
To their credit, the six IDAs of Erie County have adopted a 
Countywide IDA policy that attempts to address some of these 
issues.  For example, it makes retail, medical, and for-profit 
educational projects generally ineligible.  Unfortunately, the 
exceptions to the policy are so broad and the enforceability of it 
so lacking that Amherst’s 13 projects in 2010 included four retail 
projects, three medical projects, and one for-profit educational 
project.   
 
The Countywide IDA policy also attempts to address policy 
priorities by creating three tiers of tax exemptions, with projects 
qualifying for larger exemptions if they score better on a list of 
criteria that include employment, out-of-region sales, in-region 
purchases, capital investment, cluster/regionally strategic 
industry, compliance with the Framework for Regional Growth, 
re-use of a brownfield, local ownership, green technology, and 
professional development/lifetime learning programs.  These 
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criteria are a positive step, but they only determine how big an 
exemption the company receives, not whether it receives one, 
and if an IDA violates the policy, there is no mechanism for 
redress. 
 
In assessing whether a benefit package is helping grow the 
economy, perhaps the most difficult question is whether the 
government aid is necessary, or whether the company would 
have done the project anyway.  Erie County Executive Chris 
Collins expressed this point succinctly when he (unsuccessfully) 
objected to an ECIDA award of $74,000 in sales tax exemptions 
for Martin’s Fantasy Island amusement park to build two new 
rides: “They’re going to put these rides in regardless.  What 
company wouldn’t like a freebie, and this is a freebie.”xiv   
 
The former CEO of Alcoa, Paul O’Neill, makes a similar point: 
 
I never made an investment decision based on the Tax 
Code . . . [I]f you are giving money away I will take it.  If 
you want to give me inducements for something I am 
going to do anyway, I will take it.  But good business 
people do not do things because of inducements, they do it 
because they can see that they are going to be able to 
earn the cost of capital out of their own intelligence and 
organization of resources.xv 
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One reason companies do not make their decisions based on tax 
breaks is that the cost of state and local taxes is only 0.8% of 
the typical company’s cost of doing business – far, far less than 
labor, materials, energy, transportation, land/office space, etc.xvi  
Thus, a tax break is generally not going to be a determinative 
factor; instead, it is going to be “gravy.” 
 
The point made by Collins and O’Neill applies to almost all IDA 
deals.  Although the IDAs justify them by pointing to additional 
tax revenue the developments will eventually generate, their 
argument assumes that the company would not do the 
development but for the incentives.  This “but for” test is not one 
that the IDAs actually use in evaluating projects, so they have 
no way of knowing whether a project passes it, and the evidence 
suggests that few projects do.xvii   
 
In fairness to the IDAs, a true “but for” test would be very hard 
to implement.  To know whether a company would do a project 
without government assistance would require such a detailed 
and intimate knowledge of the company’s position and strategy, 
it is hard to imagine a government agency succeeding in it.  
Hence, this “but for” problem is a fundamental flaw of business 
incentives in general, rather than one specific to New York’s 
programs.  
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But even if a company can prove that it would not have 
expanded but for government assistance, that fact alone does 
not justify the assistance.  If the project is not expanding the 
state’s economic pie, then all the assistance is doing is favoring 
one local competitor over another.  In other words, it might be 
true that Northtown Automotive would not have expanded its 
Lexus dealership in 2010 
without help from the 
Amherst IDA.  But an 
expanded Lexus 
dealership in Amherst did 
nothing for the local 
economy.  It just gave 
one car dealer an unfair 
advantage over its local 
rivals in competing for a 
finite pool of customers. 
 
Finally, if a project is to truly grow the local economic pie, it is 
important that the jobs created go to local businesses and 
workers.   In the construction phase of subsidized projects, it is 
surprisingly common for the developer or business to hire out-
of-state contractors that bring in out-of-state workers – as in the 
case of the Holiday Inn Express in Niagara Falls, discussed more 
fully below. 
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Because of these weaknesses in economic development policy, 
all of the statistics given in annual reports, statements by 
government officials and press stories about the jobs created or 
retained by various government-assisted projects are nearly 
meaningless.  For example, the Amherst IDA reports that the 
Buffalo Rheumatology project will create nine new jobs and 
retain eight existing ones.  But every job Buffalo Rheumatology 
creates or retains is a job that would otherwise exist at another 
local rheumatology 
office.  Helping Buffalo 
Rheumatology move 
from Orchard Park into 
a larger office in 
Amherst does not 
create more customers 
for rheumatology or 
enable them to export 
their services to 
another country.  Thus, 
the assistance from the 
Amherst IDA did not 
really create or retain 
any jobs. 
 
 
 
Buffalo Rheumatology received assistance to move 
from its Orchard Park location (top) to Sheridan 
Drive in Amherst (bottom), the former site of 
Fanny’s Restaurant  
26 
 
Job Quality 
Another key component of economic 
development policy should be job 
quality.  A quality job is one with 
family-supporting pay and benefits and 
a healthy and respectful work 
environment.  Subsidized projects 
should create quality jobs during their 
construction phase and in their 
permanent operations.  Jobs that are 
unsafe or pay poverty level wages do 
not promote the public good; rather, 
they create more public costs. 
 
Job quality is especially relevant in 
western New York, where 
unemployment is currently well below 
the national average (8.4% in Buffalo Niagara in 2010, 
compared to 9.63% in the nation), but where the shift from 
good-paying manufacturing jobs to low-wage service jobs has 
been particularly dramatic and destructive.xviii 
 
Roughly one third of the jobs in western New York do not pay 
enough to keep a family safely out of poverty.  Some 125,000 
workers are in occupations for which the median wage is less 
than $20,000 per year – including salespeople, cashiers, security 
 
Problem:  Many 
subsidized projects 
subsidize poverty-
level jobs that leave 
the workers 
dependent on public 
assistance. 
 
Solution:  Do not 
subsidize low-wage 
service sector jobs in 
retail and hospitality.  
Require all subsidized 
companies to pay a 
living wage: i.e. 
enough so that the 
worker will not require 
public assistance. 
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guards, and child care workers.  Another 40,000 workers are in 
jobs where the median wage falls between $20,000 and $23,000 
– including janitors, home health aides, pre-school teachers, and 
teachers assistants.   Over 216,000 workers (34.1% of the 
workforce) are working in jobs with a median wage of under 
$26,000 per year.xix  
Low paying jobs is a key reason that the 2009 median income in 
Buffalo-Niagara ($45,811) fell so far below the national average 
($50,221), despite the fact that the local unemployment and 
poverty rates were lower than the national average.xx In other 
words, in Buffalo-Niagara, work that does not pay enough is an 
even bigger problem than unemployment.  It is not just that we 
lack jobs, but also that we lack quality jobs. 
The problem is not that the local population is under-educated 
for higher paying jobs.  In Buffalo-Niagara, only 11.3% lack a 
high school diploma, compared to 17% nationally.  As a state, 
too, we tend to be over-qualified, not under-qualified, for the 
jobs available. Only one-third of jobs in New York State require 
more than a high school degree, whereas over half of New 
Yorkers have at least some college education.xxi  The problem is 
simply that too many jobs do not pay a living wage. 
Unfortunately, most subsidy programs do not require living 
wages or even distinguish between good jobs and poverty jobs.  
The Niagara County IDA’s current project list includes five hotel 
deals.  In addition to not growing the local economy, hotels tend 
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to pay poverty wages.  The median wage in WNY for a 
housekeeper, for example, is $18,920.xxii  A housekeeper earning 
$18,920 per year is likely to need substantial government 
assistance such as Food Stamps, public housing, child care 
assistance, Home Energy Assistance, Medicaid, etc. 
 
An extreme example of bad job quality in the construction phase 
is the Holiday Inn Express that the Niagara County IDA 
subsidized on Niagara Falls 
Boulevard.  The owner hired 
an out of state contractor, 
DEC Management Inc. of 
Athens, Ga., which brought 
in out-of-state, non-union 
workers to do the job. OSHA 
cited the company for 
inadequate training and 
inadequate fall protection in 
August 2007.  Two months 
later, a worker died in a 
fall.xxiii 
 
The idea that the government should attach job quality 
standards to its business assistance programs is not new.  Forty 
three of the fifty states have job quality standards in their 
economic development programs, and over 100 cities and 
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counties have living wage laws, many of which apply to subsidies 
as well as government contracts.xxiv  New York should make sure 
that all of its development programs include requirements that 
any job subsidized must pay a living wage and that companies 
that violate worker safety laws lose assistance.  Currently, 
neither the IDA statute nor the Erie County Countywide IDA 
policy makes any provision for job quality. 
 
Jobs for Disadvantaged Workers 
In addition to providing quality jobs, government-assisted 
projects should provide jobs for workers disadvantaged by 
segregation, discrimination, and other factors outside of their 
control. 
 
Buffalo-Niagara is plagued by racial 
and geographic inequality and an 
intense urban/suburban divide.  While 
the 2009 poverty rate in the 
metropolitan area (14%) is below that 
of the state (14.2%) and the nation 
(14.3%), the poverty rate in the City 
of Buffalo is 28.8%, one of the 
nation’s highest.  Currently, of the 
123,150 people living in poverty in 
Erie County, 75,229 live in the City of 
Buffalo.xxv   
 
Problem:  Economic 
development programs 
do not help the workers 
who need them most: 
those who suffer from 
segregation, 
discrimination, and 
other disadvantages.  
 
Solution:  Require 
contractors to have 
certified apprenticeship 
and pre-apprenticeship 
programs offering 
pathways out of 
poverty. 
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Racially, Buffalo is the eighth most segregated metro area in the 
nation.xxvi  Eighty-six percent of the region’s African-Americans 
are concentrated in the cities of Buffalo and Niagara Falls.xxvii  In 
2005, the poverty rate in the metro area for white people was 
8.7%; for African-Americans it was 32.3% and for Hispanics it 
was 29.8%.xxviii  While only 1.2% of the metro area’s white 
residents live in very high poverty neighborhoods, 25.9% of 
Hispanic residents and 21.1% of African-American residents live 
in very high poverty neighborhoods.  For whites, this level of 
poverty concentration is the 23rd worst in the nation; for African 
Americans, it is the 7th worst; and for Hispanics, it is the 4th 
worst.xxix 
New York’s programs, however, do not tend to include 
requirements or incentives for companies to hire urban or 
disadvantaged workers; instead, they tend to further isolate 
those workers by subsidizing development in suburbs and exurbs, 
far from disadvantaged areas and inaccessible to public 
transportation (see the section on sprawl below).   
One solution is to require that companies receiving incentives 
hire local workers to do the construction, and that they use 
contractors with certified apprenticeship and pre-apprenticeship 
programs that offer young workers pathways out of poverty. 
For a more dramatic change, imagine if, instead of awarding tax 
breaks to businesses who might or might not hire more workers 
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as a result, and who, if they hire more workers, might simply be 
taking them from their competitors, the government simply 
hired disadvantaged workers to work on public projects.  PPG 
recently calculated that it would cost about $8.3 million to run a 
program, modeled after a successful program in Philadelphia, to 
hire disadvantaged workers to clean and green 4,000 of the 
vacant lots that blight Buffalo and Niagara Falls for ten years.  
Compare that figure to the $79 million in tax breaks granted to 
HSBC Bank for a data center in Amherst creating 12 new jobs. 
 
Sprawl Without Growth 
One of the biggest assets in western 
New York is the historic buildings, urban 
fabric, and infrastructure of the cities of 
Buffalo and Niagara Falls.  One of 
biggest regional problems is the way we 
have abandoned those cities for the 
suburbs and exurbs. 
 
The city of Buffalo, which had 580,132 
people in 1950, had dropped to 261,310 
people by 2010.  To a great extent, this 
loss reflected a move to the suburbs and 
exurbs.  The population of Erie County 
outside of Buffalo exploded from 
 
Problem:  Economic 
development 
programs tend to 
reward sprawl, rather 
than reinvestment in 
existing buildings and 
infrastructure. 
 
Solution: Create 
state-wide criteria 
that favor projects 
that re-use buildings, 
do not require new 
infrastructure, and 
promote reinvestment 
in urban cores. 
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319,106 in 1950 to 657,602 in 1980, and, after a dip in the 
1980s, has recovered to its present peak of 657,730. 
 
Similarly, the city of Niagara Falls fell from 102,394 in 1960 to 
55,593 in 2000, a 45.7% reduction, and continues to lose 
population today, with a 2008 population estimated at 51,345.  
Meanwhile, Niagara County’s population peaked in 1960 at 
242,269 before falling (mostly in the 1960s and 1970s) to its 
current level of 214,557.xxx 
 
From a regional perspective, the pattern is one of sprawl without 
growth.  From 1980 to 2006, the region’s population fell by 
5.8%, but the urbanized area grew 38%.xxxi  From 1984 to 1999, 
the average miles driven each 
day went from 10 to 15.xxxii 
 
Buffalo is suffering from a 
major crisis of housing 
abandonment, a vicious spiral 
that is perhaps the city’s 
biggest problem.  US Census 
data show a dramatic rise in 
housing vacancies within 
Buffalo.  From 1990 to 2000, 
for cities of at least 250,000, 
Buffalo went from the fifty-
Vacant lot owned by Ellicott Development Co. 
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fifth highest vacancy rate in the nation (10.2%) to third in the 
nation (15.7%).  The number of undeliverable addresses 
measured by the Postal Service in Buffalo rose from 15,651 to 
20,692 from the fourth quarter of 2005 to the third quarter of 
2010.  As of 2000, the City estimated 10,170 vacant lots and 
8,684 abandoned structures.  By April 2010, 15,897 lots were 
listed as vacant in the City’s data base.xxxiii 
As neighborhoods lose population – and especially their upper 
and middle-income residents – banks, grocery stores, services, 
and even religious institutions leave with them.  As 
disinvestment takes hold, the neighborhoods get pushed out of 
the mainstream economy and into informal economies, where 
much of the economic activity is unregulated, illegal, or 
predatory (rent-to-own stores, check cashing outlets, refund 
anticipation loans, and subprime home equity loans).xxxiv  Faced 
with an overwhelming concentration of poverty, the public school 
system cannot possibly succeed.  Children come to school 
carrying enormous burdens from their impoverished 
circumstances – burdens which even the best schools cannot 
completely overcome. Without neighborhood stability, regional 
economic health is not possible. 
Unfortunately, New York’s economic development policies have 
tended to incentivize sprawl rather than reinvestment in existing 
neighborhoods. As the 2007 study “Sprawling by the Lake” 
demonstrated, far from helping to revitalize the city of Buffalo, 
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the IDAs are subsidizing sprawl.  In 2005, the city of Buffalo, 
with 30% of the county’s population, contained only 17% of the 
IDA tax-exempted properties.  In 2005 Amherst was home to 
178 property tax exemptions totaling almost $393 million; 
Buffalo, by contrast, had 113 exemptions totaling just under 
$248 million.xxxv   
 
Similarly, a review of the Niagara County IDA’s 2010 projects 
shows that of the 17 projects, only three are in the City of 
Niagara Falls, while the wealthy, fast-growing town of Wheatfield 
captures six, including two doctor’s offices and one dentist.  It is 
simply absurd for the hard-pressed residents of the City of 
Niagara Falls – many of them lacking dental, and even health 
insurance – to be financing tax exemptions for doctors and 
dentists in Wheatfield. 
 
Erie County’s County-Wide IDA Policy attempts to incentivize 
reinvestment by creating categories for Adaptive Re-Use and 
Neighborhood Enhancement.  Unfortunately, these are crafted 
loosely and made exceptions to the normal eligibility rules, 
rather than as added points to already eligible projects.   As a 
result, they may be doing more harm than good.  Of the 13 
Amherst IDA projects in 2010, eight involved businesses 
(medical, retail, education) that do not normally qualify under 
the countywide policy, but that were approved based on the 
Adaptive Re-Use and/or Neighborhood Enhancement exceptions, 
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including a speculative office/retail project on Main St. in village 
of Williamsville – one of the most prosperous, upscale retail 
strips in the region.   A recent project funded by the Erie County 
IDA – a Dollar General store in South Buffalo – had somewhat 
more justification because it is located in a challenged 
neighborhood with a weak market for re-use, but still raised 
questions because it is a retail store with low wage jobs – a re-
slicing of the economic pie, not a growing of it.xxxvi 
 
Sustainable Development 
The story of sprawl points to a broader issue.  To be strong and 
durable, an economy must be sustainable.  And to be a 
worthwhile investment, a project must not cost society more in 
environmental burdens than it produces in jobs and tax revenues.   
 
Unfortunately, the State heavily subsidizes some of the biggest 
polluters in the region.  AES, a multinational company which 
reported net income of $910 million in the first half of 2011, has 
demanded and won extensive tax breaks from the Niagara 
County IDA to keep open its coal-fired power plant in Somerset.  
As one local tax payer commented, “My school taxes went up 23% 
because of that.”xxxvii    
 
NRG has received large tax exemptions from the Erie County IDA 
(as well as Empire Zone tax breaks) for its coal plant in 
Tonawanda, which is by far the largest source of pollution in Erie 
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County, releasing some 2,642,883 pounds of toxins per 
year.xxxviii  On a more sustainable note, the Erie County IDA also 
provided $115 million in public bonding for pollution control at 
the plant – but it is dispiriting that the State Attorney General 
had to win a consent order with NRG to get that pollution 
control.xxxix 
 
Many states have adopted policies under which projects are 
rewarded for re-using existing buildings and infrastructure and 
for locating near public transit, for using green building and 
operational techniques and for avoiding environmental harm.  
New York’s affordable housing programs already have extensive 
green criteria that the developer must meet to get tax breaks, 
but New York’s economic development programs do not.    
 
 
IDA Governance 
 
Overlap and Intra-Regional Competition 
Many economic development agencies and entities in New York 
have overlapping jurisdiction.  A company seeking government 
assistance must commonly apply to multiple sources with 
different rules and priorities and different deadlines.  A citizen 
trying to understand a subsidy package must master a 
bewildering array of agencies and programs. 
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Even within a single program, there is the problem of overlap 
and intramural competition.  A classic 
example is the nine separate IDAs 
serving Buffalo-Niagara, each with its 
own board and programs.  What 
makes the IDA system truly pernicious 
is the way that it severs the link 
between taxation and representation.  
A town can form its own IDA, 
appointed by and accountable only to 
that town board, with the power to 
give exemptions from taxes owed not 
only to that town, but also to the 
school district, county, and state.  
 
It would be one thing for the Town of Clarence to subsidize a 
Dash’s supermarket with its own money; it is quite another thing 
for it to subsidize the market with money from the school district, 
county, and state.  Similarly, residents of Buffalo help foot the 
bill when Clarence subsidizes the “New Buffalo Shirt Factory,” 
formerly located in Buffalo, now located in Clarence.  To add 
insult to injury, the Clarence IDA took out full page ads in the 
Buffalo News touting their success in subsidizing these two 
projects.  Who paid for those ads?  Ultimately, all the taxpayers 
of the state and county. 
 
 
Problem:  IDAs 
overlap, compete with 
one another, and give 
rise to expensive and 
inefficient multiple 
bureaucracies. 
 
Solution: Merge IDAs 
so that there is only 
one per economic 
region, or, at most, 
one per county.  
Reduce the nine IDAs 
in Buffalo-Niagara to 
one or two. 
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To prevent intra-state pirating, IDAs may not assist intra-state 
movement of industrial or manufacturing plants unless it is 
“reasonably necessary” to keep the company from moving out of 
state or to preserve the competitive position of the company in 
its industry. But pirating remains common.  A 2006 state 
comptroller audit of six IDAs found that of their 108 projects, 21 
involved moves within the state.  While all the companies 
claimed that the moves were “reasonably necessary” under state 
law, none of the IDAs had documented or verified the claims.xl 
The Amherst IDA has aggressively subsidized “spec” office 
complexes that draw tenants from Buffalo and other suburbs.  In 
one instance, a court found the Amherst IDA guilty of pirating 
office tenants from downtown Buffalo.xli But the practices 
continue.  Several years ago, the Amherst IDA granted Uniland 
$1.46 million in tax breaks to build an office building, even 
though Uniland had not disclosed any of its prospective 
tenants.xlii  This past year, the Amherst IDA gave exemptions for 
an office/retail complex on Main Street in Williamsville with no 
identified tenants. 
 
Ideally, New York should have only one IDA for each economic 
region.  Thus, Buffalo-Niagara, which shares a single economy, 
would share a single IDA, instead of nine.  At a minimum, the 
State should forbid cities or towns to have their own IDAs when 
a county IDA is in existence. 
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Overhead 
The IDAs are not cheap to operate.  The 2010 expenditures for 
Erie County IDA were $6.6 million, for Niagara County IDA $1.2 
million, and for Amherst IDA $0.7 million.xliii  The top salary at 
the Amherst IDA is $169,000 – almost exactly the salary of the 
Governor of New York (by contrast, the Mayor of Buffalo makes 
about $105,000 per year).xliv  It is sometimes said that the IDAs 
are not funded with taxpayer dollars, but that is not really true.  
IDAs get their funding as a percentage cut of the deals they do 
with companies.  In other words, part of the tax savings they 
give to companies is returned to them as a fee.  As 
demonstrated above, the tax savings given to companies are not 
free to the area’s taxpayers.  In many cases, every dollar of 
incentive offered is a dollar lost to tax revenues, which must be 
made up for by all the other taxpayers in the area.   
 
Incentive Structure 
The fact that IDAs get their revenues as a percent of the 
exemptions they grant creates a large conflict of interest.  For 
IDAs, the natural incentive is to grant as many tax exemption, 
and as large tax exemptions, as possible.  This generates the 
fees that pay the IDAs’ salaries, rent, professional services, and 
marketing expenses.  The more deals an IDA does, the more 
“successful” it is, and the more highly its staff can be 
compensated.   
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This incentive structure is misaligned, to 
say the least.  The IDAs get to play with 
free money.  There is no negative 
consequence to the IDA board and staff 
from giving away local and state tax 
revenue.  The interests of the IDA and 
the business seeking the tax break are 
nearly completely aligned; both of them 
want to do the deal and to have the 
deal be as large as possible.  There is 
no one in the loop to guard the public’s 
interest in not wasting money. 
Campaign Donors 
Given that IDAs share a financial interest with the companies 
they serve, it is natural for them to become cozy with them.  
Unfortunately, this problem is compounded by the fact that 
companies are increasingly able to buy favorable treatment from 
the elected officials who should be standing guard over the 
economic development systems.   
 
In 2010, Verizon was offered a suite of NYPA, IDA, and other 
subsidies worth $614 million for 200 jobs, or $3.1 million per job, 
to build a data center in Somerset.  In the end, Verizon decided 
it did not need the new data center and walked away.xlv But how 
did Verizon obtain this lavish package in the first place?  
Certainly, it didn’t hurt that Verizon donated more than $1.2 
 
Problem:  IDAs are 
funded with a 
percentage of the tax 
exemptions they 
offer, giving them the 
incentive to offer as 
many and as large 
exemptions as 
possible. 
 
Solution: Fund IDAs 
with a separate 
funding stream that 
is not contingent on 
the deals they make. 
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million in campaign contributions over 
the last five years and spent $9.3 
million in lobbying state and local 
governments in New York from 2006 to 
2009, employing 14 in-house lobbyists 
and outside lobbying firms, too.xlvi 
 
In addition to companies seeking tax 
breaks, law firms and other businesses 
seeking lucrative IDA work are often 
large campaign donors.  The Harris 
Beach law firm has given over $60,000 
in campaign contributions to Erie County 
Executive Chris Collins and $20,000 to 
the Erie County Republican Party during 
the Collins era.  It is not surprising, then, that Collins appeared 
“very intent” on hiring Harris Beach to replace the law firm that 
had represented the IDA for the previous 18 years.  Harris Beach 
has made at least $740,000 and perhaps as much as $2 million 
from its IDA work since January 2009.xlvii  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Problem:  Campaign 
donations by 
businesses seeking 
subsidies or 
contracts from IDAs 
distort the process. 
 
Solution:  Place 
stronger limits on the 
ability of IDAs to give 
tax exemptions or 
professional 
contracts to 
businesses that have 
donated to the 
campaigns of IDA 
board members. 
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Board Membership 
The seven member board of the Amherst 
IDA includes five members with a clearly 
corporate orientation, one attorney, and 
one professor.  No members represent 
workers.  The boards of Erie County IDA 
and Niagara County IDA are somewhat 
more balanced, but still clearly tilted 
toward corporate interests.  When non-
corporate individuals fill places on boards 
such as this, they can often feel that they 
are there for window dressing, or feel co-
opted.  As one local IDA board member 
candidly confessed, his board is “very in 
with the builders,” “there’s a lot going on 
that I’m not privy to,” and “when you’re 
there, you get co-opted a little bit.”xlviii 
 
In some cases New York’s statutes prescribe the membership of 
individual IDA boards.  For example, the Erie County IDA’s 
authorizing statute requires that the board include various public 
officials, the president of the Buffalo AFL-CIO, the president of 
the NAACP, the board chair of the chamber of commerce, five 
members representing the business, labor, and minority 
communities appointed jointly by the county executive and the 
legislative chair, and others.xlix  Where the State has not made 
 
Problem:  IDA 
boards are 
dominated by 
business interests 
with a pro-subsidy 
bias. 
 
Solution:  State 
legislation should 
require that most 
members of an IDA 
be drawn from 
citizen groups, non-
profits, academic 
institutions, elected 
bodies, and other 
representatives of 
the public interest. 
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specific arrangements, however, it leaves it up to the local 
municipality.  While the statute suggests that school boards and 
organized labor be represented, it does not require it.l  One 
simple IDA reform would be to require all IDA boards to have 
more balanced representation, including school boards, labor 
interests, environmental, and public interest groups, and 
ensuring that private business interests do not form the majority. 
 
 
Accountability 
Around the country, there has been a 
growing move to require results in 
return for subsidies, and to ask for 
money back where jobs are not created.  
Over 20 states and dozens of cities use 
clawbacks that require full or partial 
reimbursement when companies fail to 
fulfill their promises.li  Minnesota 
requires all state and local subsidy 
agreements to include clawbacks and 
bans noncompliant companies from 
receiving further subsidies for five years 
or until they have repaid their debt.lii 
Virginia, ranked by Forbes magazine as 
the top state for business for several years in a row, has 
clawbacks in its Major Business Facility Jobs Tax Credit.liii  
 
Problem:  Many IDA 
and NYPA subsidies 
are wasted on 
businesses that do not 
deliver on their 
promises of jobs and 
other community 
benefits. 
 
Solution:  Add 
clawback provisions to 
all subsidy programs, 
allowing the 
government to 
terminate and reclaim 
subsidies when targets 
are not met. 
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Connecticut requires repayment of the full value of a subsidy if 
the company relocates outside the state within ten years or 
during the term of the agreement, whichever is longer.liv  
Clawbacks have appeal for both Republicans and Democrats.  In 
Ohio, for example, Republican governor John Kasich signed 
nearly a dozen “clawback” orders in spring 2011, demanding 
that companies that had not met their job goals return some of 
their subsidy money.lv 
 
New York’s economic development programs have very few 
clawback provisions.  The IDA statute lacks them entirely. A 
company may keep all of its tax exemptions even if it utterly 
fails to deliver on its promises of jobs or other benefits to the 
region. Erie County’s Countywide IDA Policy includes a clawback 
for cases of intentional, material falsehood in the company’s 
application, but it also states that “the failure of an applicant to 
meet any specific employment numbers set forth in the 
application . . . shall not be deemed to be false or misleading in 
any material aspect.”lvi  In other words, the company is not 
allowed to lie, except about how many jobs it will create or 
retain!  That is truly a clawback with no claws.   
 
A related problem is that IDAs and local governments are often 
left with no effective recourse when projects fail and aid 
recipients fail to make their PILOTs.  For example, the Niagara 
Falls School Board recently wrote off $3.4 million in outstanding 
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PILOTS, including $1.2 million owed by Niagara Splash Park, 
$1.2 million from Falls Street Faire, $393,000 from Aqua Falls 
(the failed aquarium project by the Rainbow Bridge), and 
$309,000 from Rainbow Square.lvii 
 
In addition to clawbacks, more detailed and public reporting will 
help to improve the accountability of both development agencies 
and the companies they assist.  The Public Authorities Reform 
Act made substantial improvements in the New York’s 
development reporting, but much more can be done.  Illinois, for 
example, offers a searchable database with reports from subsidy 
recipients on jobs created or retained and salaries.lviii 
 
New York Power Authority 
 
NYPA is the largest publicly owned utility in the nation, providing 
New York with more than one quarter of its electricity and 
operating more than 1,400 miles of transmission lines. Run by a 
board appointed by governor, NYPA owns 17 power plants that 
supply about one fourth of the state’s electricity needs.  NYPA is 
an unusual government entity in that it tends to run a “profit.”  
In 2010 NYPA reported net income of $181 million.lix 
 
 NYPA operates a variety of economic development programs, 
including Economic Development Power,lx Power for Jobs,lxi 
Preservation Power, Expansion Power, Industrial Incentive 
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Awards,lxii Replacement Power, and Energy Cost Savings Benefit 
Awards.lxiii  Most of these programs award low-cost power to 
individual companies in exchange for promises of job retention 
or creation.  For example, Power for Jobs serves 405 employers 
with 286.9 MW of low cost power.  Economic Development Power 
offers 153 MW of power to 46 companies around the state, with 
a balance of 106.7 MW unallocated.lxiv  Preservation Power 
serves mainly one business, Alcoa, which receives 478 MW of 
low cost power from the Massena Power Plant.  The size of these 
allocations makes NYPA the biggest economic development 
agency in the state.  Alcoa alone receives a subsidy worth $5.6 
billion over its 30 year life.lxv 
 
NYPA, which employs roughly 2600 people, has long been noted 
for its high salaries and overhead and questionable expenditures.  
In 2009-2010, the State Comptroller found, NYPA spent 
$160,000 on 21 holiday parties and picnics and $85,000 on gifts 
for employee service and recognition, plus another $57,000 on 
service award and recognition ceremony expenses.lxvi  In 2005, 
the Buffalo News found a “gold-plated bureaucracy at NYPA, with 
1,600 employees earning an average of more than $82,000 per 
year.  NYPA had issued its staff 245 cell phones, 274 
Blackberries, 303 laptops, and 720 credit cards.  NYPA’s 15 
lawyers earned an average of $133,000, but NYPA also spent 
$17,200 per business day on outside lawyers.lxvii 
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In 2007, the News reported that NYPA’s relicensing negotiators 
and their guests had violated various policies on expenditure as 
they and their guests spent over $5,300 of public money on 
meals at fancy Buffalo restaurants such as the Left Bank and 
Oliver’s and rented SUVs instead of small and mid-sized cars.lxviii  
For years, NYPA paid most of its employees bonuses each year, 
spending some $3 million per year on them, but this was 
discontinued in 2009 after NYPA proposed a rate hike and faced 
a storm of criticism.lxix 
 
Niagara Power Plant 
NYPA plays a special role in western New York because of the 
Niagara Power Plant.  The Niagara Plant opened in 1961, 
replacing two private utilities.  The Niagara Plant provides 56% 
of NYPA’s electricity and does so very cheaply, because 
hydropower costs about 0.5 cents per kilowatt to generate, 
compared to 2.3 cents for coal and 9.3 cents for natural gas. 
 
Federal and state laws include a number of requirements as to 
how NYPA allocates the power from the Niagara Plant.  Roughly 
one-third must go to companies within 30 miles of the Plant as 
Replacement and Expansion Power.  At least 50% is reserved 
“for the benefit of the people as consumers, particularly 
domestic and rural consumers” at “the lowest rate reasonably 
possible and in such manner as to encourage the widest possible 
use,” with preference given to “public bodies and non-profit 
 cooperatives.” lxx  Currently, NYPA meets th
of the power to non-
cooperative utilities, and about 17% to three for
National Grid, NYSEG, and Rochester Gas and Electric.   In 
addition, federal law requires that a “reasonabl
preference power, not to exceed 20%, must be available to 
neighboring states. lxxi
utilities in neighboring states.  After fulfilling the statutory 
requirements, NYPA is left with about 2% of the Niagara Plant 
power to sell at market rate to utilities.
 
Niagara Falls is an amazing asset, producing enough electricity 
to power 2.5 million homes in a very cheap and green manner.  
But local residents see many burdens but few benefits from 
living near the Niagara Pl
33%
17%
10%
2%
Who gets power from the Niagara Plant
is by selling about 33% 
profit municipal utilities and rural 
-profit utilities: 
e portion” of 
  NYPA sells about 10% to nonprofit 
 
ant.  
38%
38% to local industries
33% to nonprofit municipal 
utilities and rural 
cooperative utilities
17% to for-profit utilities
10% to nonprofit utilities in 
neighboring states
2% on the open market
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Currently, about half of the power generated is used locally, 
mainly through the Replacement and Expansion Power contracts 
with local companies (38%), plus the 17% that goes to National 
Grid, NYSEG, and Rochester Gas and Electric – enough to 
provide about 5% of the power they sell to local customers.lxxii  
As of 2012, the power currently going to these three utilities will 
be used instead for the statewide Recharge NY program, so it 
appears that western New York will see even less benefit from 
it.lxxiii  (The switch to Recharge NY also leaves it unclear how 
NYPA will meet the federal requirement of using at least 50% of 
Niagara Plant power for residential customers). lxxiv 
 
Living near the Niagara Plant does not result in cheap electricity.  
Residential customers in Erie and Niagara Counties pay electric 
bills at rates 50% higher than the national average – a 
difference that adds up to some $400 per year.lxxv  The only 
residential customers in the state who get cheap electricity from 
the Falls are those served by non-profit municipal utilities and 
rural cooperative utilities, who get 33% of the power from the 
Plant at a very low rate.   
 
No residents in Niagara County are served by these non-profits, 
and in Erie County, only Springville and Akron are. As a result of 
this system, residents served by the non-profit utilities in places 
like Akron pay much lower electric bills than those served by 
private utilities.  The Village of Springville advertises that its 
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customers pay about one fourth the rate of neighboring 
communities.lxxvi  Where the average National Grid residential 
customer was paying $90 per month in 2006, the average Akron 
customer was paying $31.lxxvii   
 
The Niagara Plant was opened in 1961, replacing two privately 
owned facilities.  The creation of the plant, led by Robert Moses, 
then the chair of NYPA, had severe impacts on local communities 
and ecologies.  NYPA seized some 500 acres of Tuscarora Indian 
land to build the plant; the Tuscarora protested but lost, in a 
case that made it to the U.S. Supreme Court.lxxviii  NYPA blasted 
13 million cubic yards of rock and transported 34 million cubic 
yards of stone and earth, dumping much of it in the Escarpment 
and wrecking ecosystems there.  It built intakes and tunnels to 
carry the water 4.5 miles from the river to the generation plant 
and created the Robert Moses Parkway along the river and gorge, 
which ruined wetlands and other environmentally important 
areas.lxxix   
 
The shift from privately owned plants to a public authority was 
disastrous for local governments and school districts, because 
NYPA does not pay property taxes.  NYPA’s 2,900 acres of 
property in Niagara County has an assessed value of $1.8 
billion.lxxx  From 1982 to 2003, this exemption cost Niagara Falls 
alone roughly $239 million in city and school taxes.  The local 
communities may want to press NYPA for a payment in lieu of 
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taxes.  There is some history of state government compensating 
local communities for loss of property tax revenue; for example, 
the State pays Albany over $10 million per year in payments in 
lieu of taxes for its land holdings in the city.lxxxi 
 
For many decades, the Niagara Falls Power Plant has been 
NYPA’s golden goose, with its profits used to subsidize downstate 
projects, pay for its “gold-plated bureaucracy,” and help the 
State plug deficit holes in its general fund.  In one audit, the 
state comptroller found that some $2 billion in profits from the 
Niagara and Massena plants had been used to cover $1.1 billion 
in losses from 1987 to 1994 in other aspects of NYPA’s 
operations.lxxxii  The State frequently turns to NYPA for “sweeps” 
or “voluntary contributions” to help it meet its budget ($170 
million from 2003 to 2005, and $500 million in 2011).lxxxiii 
 
In general a 2001 study commissioned by NYPA found that only 
14% of the Niagara plant’s economic benefit stayed in Western 
New York.lxxxiv  This figure is not surprising because, as we have 
seen, about half the low cost power from Niagara goes to other 
parts of the state or other states, and, of the power used locally, 
much of it goes to big out-of-state companies like Olin and 
Occidental that employ very few local workers, or to for-profit 
utilities like National Grid and NYSEG.  Except for the residents 
of Akron and Springville, none of it goes directly to local 
residents.  Below, we examine in more detail the two main ways 
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that NYPA has addressed regional needs: Replacement and 
Expansion Power, and Relicensing agreements. 
 
 
Replacement and Expansion Power  
Federal and state law reserve more than 
one third of the generation capacity of the 
Niagara plant for industry within 30 miles 
of the plant, to be sold slightly above cost, 
which translates into about one fifth the 
current market rate (in 2008, for example, 
it was 1.6 cents per kilowatt-hour 
compared to 6 cents on the open 
market).lxxxv NYPA makes individual 
contracts with local companies for low 
cost power; many of those contracts 
expire in 2013.  
 
As of March 31, 2011, there were 101 
allocations of Expansion Power to 71 companies, totaling 237.6 
MW, with 12.4 MW unallocated, and 130 allocations of 
Replacement Power to 76 companies totaling 421.3 MW, with a 
balance of 23.7 MW was available for allocation.lxxxvi  Many 
companies receive both Expansion and Replacement Power. 
 
 
Problem:  NYPA has 
violated its legal 
duty to devote more 
than one third of the 
power from the 
Niagara Plant to 
businesses within 30 
miles of the Plant. 
 
Solution: Require 
NYPA to make up for 
all the lost subsidies 
with additional 
allocations to 
Western New York 
businesses. 
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Replacement Power is reserved for customers of the private 
plants that the Niagara plant replaced.  These companies are 
required to meet only very relaxed standards on jobs to retain 
their power, when their contracts come up for renewal.  The 
“new” customers, in contrast, who receive the Expansion Power, 
must meet somewhat stricter criteria: ten factors including jobs, 
wages and benefits, investment in the facility by the owners, etc.  
Enforcement is limited, however; between 2003 and 2005, 23 
companies failed to meet their job obligations, but only six had 
their allocation reduced.lxxxvii   
 
Although some 100 local companies get low cost power, two 
thirds of it goes to just ten companies.  Recipients include Delphi, 
Ford, GM, DuPont, Moog, Goodyear-Dunlop, General Mills, 
Praxair, American Axle.  Most of the biggest recipients are owned 
and headquartered elsewhere.  The two biggest recipients are 
the Olin Corporation, headquartered in Missouri, and Occidental 
Chemical, which is headquartered in Dallas.  Although employing 
just 418 workers (1% of the workers in these programs), they 
receive some 29% of the power, at discounts worth $53 
million.lxxxviii  A national expert on economic development 
subsidies called these “probably the biggest he has come 
across.”lxxxix  All together, the participating companies get almost 
as much in subsidies ($272 million in 2001) as they pay in state 
and local taxes ($293 million in 2001).xc  Subsidies this rich do 
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relatively little for the local economy, as their benefits flow 
mainly to the out-of-town owners of the companies. 
 
Starting around 2000, plant closings and downsizings led to 
some of the allocation not being used.  In 2008, the Buffalo 
News found that one fifth of the low cost power earmarked for 
local businesses had gone unused over the past four years and 
had instead been sold by NYPA for an estimated $161 million.xci  
Local business owners and elected leaders complained that NYPA 
was being overly restrictive in its allocations and not working to 
find new customers that met its criteria. 
 
In 2005, state legislation required that proceeds from the sale of 
70 megawatts of the unused power be used to fund the Energy 
Cost Savings Benefit program, subsidizing electric bills for 105 
companies around the state, of which only 3 were in Erie and 
Niagara counties.xcii  As of May 2007, the power had netted 
about $26 million for the program. The State had amended the 
law to make 70 megawatts available for Western New York in 
2007, but as of May 2007 only 2 megawatts had been allocated.  
The law expired June 30, 2007.xciii  Meanwhile, the State had 
created another program financed by the sale of unused 
Expansion Power, the Industrial Incentives Awards, and funded 
some ten large projects around the state with that (none in 
western New York).  
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Niagara County interests sued NYPA over the money in 2009; 
their suit was dismissed but remains on appeal.  Meanwhile, in 
April 2009 Congressman Higgins threatened to introduce federal 
legislation on the issue; after months of negotiation, NYPA 
agreed to amend its Industrial Incentive program to make a 
large award to the Canal Side project in Buffalo (see below for 
more information on this deal).xciv   
 
William Ross, chair of the Niagara County legislature, would like 
a similar deal for Niagara County.  On behalf of most of the 
county’s mayors and town supervisors, he crafted a “Niagara 
Initiative” calling for a new public works building, restoration of 
locks in Lockport, the development of an industrial park in North 
Tonawanda at a cost of some $225 million.  Mayor Dyster of 
Niagara Falls, who is not part of that initiative, has his own 
proposal for some $110 million in spending in Niagara Falls on 
tourism, infrastructure, and a science and technology center at 
Niagara University.xcv 
 
In 2010, the State passed legislation to create yet another pool 
of economic development funds from the sale of the unused 
power, estimated at from $5 million to $15 million per year, but 
State legislators, development officials, and NYPA have been 
arguing about how to implement the law and the fund has not 
been established.  NYPA argues that the advisory panel created 
by the law to screen and recommend applicants lacks legal 
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standing, and that not all the proceeds from the sale of the 
unused power should go into the pool.  The bill’s sponsors, 
George Maziarz and Dennis Gabryszak, disagree with NYPA.  
They introduced a new bill in 2011 that would move funding 
authority from NYPA to the ESDC; the bill passed the Senate but 
did not come to a vote in the Assembly.xcvi 
 
NYPA data showed profits from the sale of unused power of 
some $8.5 million from August 2010 to July 2011.  NYPA also 
showed that it had reduced the percent of power going unused 
from 17 percent in 2008 to 13 percent in 2011, and that it had 
already earmarked all but 1.6% of it to present and future uses, 
which would greatly reduce the revenue stream in the future, as 
those new users come online.xcvii 
 
To summarize, the Replacement and Expansion Power programs 
have brought surprisingly little benefit to Buffalo-Niagara.  Much 
of the power has been wasted on a handful of large, non-local 
companies that produce very few jobs, and NYPA has taken the 
unused power from the program and, rather than devoting it to 
Buffalo-Niagara, has used it to pad its own bottom line or to 
spread it to companies around the state through other programs.  
This misallocation is possibly illegal and certainly unjust and 
wasteful. 
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Relicensing 
In March 2007 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
granted NYPA a new 50 year license to operate the Niagara Plant.  
The re-licensing ended a spate of separate negotiations with 
local governments and other institutions.   
 
The re-licensing settlements included 
$59.5 million in “license measures,” 
designed specifically to mitigate the 
negative impacts of the Plant.  These 
include habitat improvement projects 
(to remedy harm from water 
fluctuation), public access 
improvements, a parks and recreation 
fund, and capital improvements to the 
local sewer system. 
 
The settlements also included $324.8 
million in “non-license measures” 
negotiated with various parties.  The largest agreement was with 
the Niagara Power Coalition.  In the early 1990s seven 
municipalities formed the Niagara Power Coalition to negotiate 
with NYPA over the relicensing.  The seven were Niagara County, 
the city of Niagara Falls, the towns of Niagara and Lewiston, and 
three school districts: Lewiston-Porter, Niagara Falls, and 
Niagara-Wheatfield.  The Niagara Power Coalition negotiated a 
 
Problem:  Under 
NYPA’s leadership, 
Western New York sees 
more burdens than 
benefits from hosting 
one of the state’s 
greatest assets: the 
Niagara Power plant. 
 
Solution:  Require 
NYPA to devote more 
of its low-cost power to 
residential and 
business customers in 
Western New York. 
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deal with NYPA under which they will divide $5 million per year 
for 50 years and also can buy 25 megawatts of low cost power to 
use themselves or use for economic development.xcviii 
 
Another settlement was with the Tuscarora Nation, which 
received $21.8 million, one MW of power, and a 52 acre parcel of 
land.xcix  NYPA then reached additional deals with Niagara 
University, which received a capital fund of $9.5 million, a 
landscape fund of $1 million, a 24 acre parcel of land, and 3 MW 
of discounted power.c   
 
Lastly, NYPA made a deal with Erie County and the City of 
Buffalo under which it would support the redevelopment of Canal 
Side on Buffalo’s waterfront (described more fully below). 
 
As part of the settlement agreements, NYPA agreed to set up 
four Greenway funds, administered by four standing committees: 
Buffalo and Erie County ($2 million per year); Greenway 
Ecological ($1 million per year); Host Community Greenway 
Fund ($3 million per year), and State Parks ($3 million per year).  
New York State then established a Niagara River Greenway 
Commission to create a Greenway Plan and to make 
recommendations for funding, but it is the Standing Committees 
created by the Relicensing Agreement, not the Greenway 
Commission, who ultimately choose, manage, and supervise the 
projects funded with the NYPA money.ci   
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Many observers have questioned how closely the Standing 
Committees are following the Greenway Plan and have accused 
them of frittering the money away on isolated pet projects rather 
than using it strategically to build an outstanding, integrated 
Greenway.cii  For example, the Host Community Standing 
Committee recently awarded $15,000 to the Historic Lewiston 
Jazz Festival, despite the fact that it was an event rather than a 
project, and despite the fact that it apparently violated the 
Relicensing Agreement provision that projects that already 
existed before 2007 could not be funded.  The Committee also 
approved funding for a War of 1812 reenactment and for a 
Tuscarora Heroes monument in Lewiston.ciii 
 
The Relicensing Deal led to many regional benefits, but many 
observers felt that the region did not get all that it should have.  
While there was talk of a one billion dollar deal, NYPA calculated 
its expenses over the 50 years of the Relicensing Agreement, in 
inflation adjusted dollars, at $391 million, or $7.8 million per 
year – the equivalent of 17 days of net profits at the plant’s 
current rate of profit.civ   
 
Clearly, NYPA had its own institutional priorities during the 
process, which often conflicted with those of other actors, and 
there was no effective superseding authority to provide direction.  
The result was a wasteful and corrupting free-for-all as different 
agencies and interest groups scrambled to make deals. 
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NYPA spent more than $45 million on the relicensing effort, 
including large sums for lawyers and consultants.cv  One of 
NYPA’s strategies was to buy off potential opponents with 
contributions.  Thus, it donated $7.1 million to the Niagara Falls 
School Board to renovate recreational facilities, on the condition 
that the School Board support its relicensing efforts.cvi  NYPA 
also increased it “community contributions” to groups in Niagara 
and Erie Counties; having averaged $94,000 from 1999 through 
2004, they soared to $264,000 in 2005.  Erie County received a 
$40,000 donation; and NYPA increased its annual contribution to 
the Buffalo Niagara Partnership from $25 in 2003 to $5,000 in 
2004 to $50,378 in 2005.cvii 
 
NYPA picked off potential opponents one by one.  The Niagara 
Power Coalition of local municipalities began with a strong 
campaign.  But after NYPA voiced displeasure with the 
aggressive stance of the Coalition, it changed its tack and fired 
its lawyer with relicensing experience in favor of Republican 
insiders with no particular expertise: Mercury Public Affairs, a 
firm very close to Governor Pataki, and Harris Beach law firm, 
one of whose partners was (and is) on the NYPA board.  The 
Coalition reached its own deal in late winter of 2004. cviii 
 
“As soon as they split off, made their own deal, it was every man 
for himself,” according to Kevin Donovan, a senior official with 
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the United Auto Workers who was involved in the negotiations 
and who tried to unite all the groups involved in a Community 
Consensus Committee.  “We were going to negotiate as one, but 
everyone was going and doing their own thing.”cix 
 
In addition to fighting NYPA and coping with internal dissension, 
advocates had to cope with opposition from groups that were 
already receiving cheap power and did not want to disrupt the 
status quo.  Two powerful groups entered the battle on the other 
side, trying to prevent NYPA from increasing its settlement offers.  
One group included 51 municipal utilities and rural cooperatives; 
the other, Power for Economic Prosperity, led by Praxair, 
included 22 local industries that receive 80 percent of the 
replacement and expansion power.cx 
 
Mission Creep and Corporate Capture 
In New York, many entities that should be focused on other 
missions are performing economic development functions.cxi  
NYPA is a public utility.  Its mission should be to produce power 
as cheaply and cleanly as possible for all the residents and 
businesses of New York.  And yet NYPA runs the biggest 
economic development programs in the state.  Because NYPA is 
a “shadow government” operating with much autonomy, it is 
particularly prone to corporate capture. 
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In 2007, after threatening to leave the 
state, Alcoa reached a deal with the 
State for $5.6 billion in low cost power 
(one quarter of market rate) over 30 
years, in exchange for a promise to 
invest $600 million in its Massena facility 
and not to eliminate more than 165 jobs 
from its work force of 1,065.  In a kind 
of subsidy kickback, Alcoa also agreed to 
fund a $10 million regional economic 
development fund to be administered 
jointly by NYPA and ESDC. cxii 
 
NYPA can give outlandish subsidies like 
the Alcoa deal because it can afford to.  
It is an autonomous authority with 
revenues that far outstrip its expenses.  
It does not have to balance that $5.6 
billion gift to Alcoa against cuts in public 
education and health care. 
 
Because NYPA tends to turn a large profit each year, based 
largely on the Niagara Plant, it becomes a kind of slush fund to 
be raided by those with enough political might to do so.  
Sometimes, this results in the State “sweeping” NYPA revenues 
 
Problem:  NYPA, 
which should be in 
the power business, is 
poorly suited to doing 
economic 
development and 
does so in isolation 
from other economic 
development 
program, in an often 
ad hoc and politicized 
manner. 
 
Solution: Begin 
process of moving 
economic 
development 
functions to Empire 
State Development, 
and prioritizing 
NYPA’s primary 
mission of providing 
low-cost power for all 
New York residents. 
and businesses. 
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into the general fund to balance the budget.  Sometimes, it 
results in the funding of pet projects, such as Canal Side.   
 
As part of its relicensing deal with the city of Buffalo and Erie 
County, NYPA agreed to pay: 
• $1 million per year to the Empire State Development 
Corporation;  
• $4 million in two lump sum payments to the Erie Canal 
Harbor Development Corporation; 
• An initial payment of $2.5 million to a Waterfront 
Development Fund, followed by $1 million per year, plus 
an additional annual sum based on the net value of MW of 
power.cxiii 
 
At the urging of Congressman Brian Higgins, who was pressing 
NYPA over its sale of unused Replacement and Expansion power, 
NYPA agreed in fall 2010 to sweeten the Canal Side relicensing 
deal by making its payments over 20 years instead of 50, 
yielding a net present value of $8.4 million per year for 20 years 
– enough to finance $105 million to $110 million in bonds to pay 
for infrastructure at Canal Side.cxiv 
 
In addition, NYPA made an Industrial Incentive award to Canal 
Side.  In 2009, NYPA’s Economic Development Power Allocation 
Board (EDPAB) had approved a plan to make Industrial Incentive 
Awards to companies at identifiable risk of closure or relocation 
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to another state.  On February 2, 2010, EDPAB approved a 
modified plan to allow the use of Industrial Incentive money for 
the Erie Canal Harbor Development Corporation, in the amount 
of $3.7 million per year for 20 years (2010 to 2029).  While the 
other awards had included specific job commitments, this award 
did not.   
 
The bright side of this change was that, under pressure from 
Congressman Higgins and others, NYPA was returning some of 
the Expansion Power money to western New York, where it 
belongs.  Canal Side was the first local project to get Industrial 
Incentives funding, and it received the largest award yet. 
 
The downside was the ad hoc, politicized nature of the change 
and the questionable nature of the Canal Side project at that 
time.  The Industrial Incentives program, which had been 
directed toward distressed industrial businesses at risk of closing 
or leaving the state, was suddenly altered to include a new, 
multi-use project which was then centered on a big box retail 
store (Bass Pro).  At the meeting approving the deal, the Vice-
Chair of NYPA, Jonathan Foster, complained about the 
“significant reallocation of monies” done on a “very fast 
timetable,” with the public announcement of the deal coming 
before the trustees had even voted on it.  He did not feel that 
the project was consistent with NYPA’s mission or fiduciary 
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responsibilities and was very frustrated with how it was 
handled.cxv  
 
Eyebrows were further raised when ECHDC and ESDC attempted 
to hire the law firm of Harris Beach as bond counsel (at $400 per 
hour) to sell the bonds that NYPA was funding – despite the fact 
that NYPA chair Michael Townsend is a partner at Harris Beach.  
(The bond counsel contract was revoked after news reports drew 
attention to the conflict of interest).cxvi   
 
The deal also highlighted the cozy, corporate-friendly nature of 
the NYPA board.  The seven-member board of NYPA, appointed 
by the Governor, has six strongly corporate members and one 
retired judge.  Most of the members are heavy contributors to 
political campaigns.    
 
The Canal Side project itself was an illustration of the extent to 
which wealthy businesses and individuals can capture state 
agencies.  The State was prepared to offer the Bass Pro 
company some $60 million in subsidies to locate an outdoor 
store in downtown Buffalo.  This idea had its origin in the 
friendship between Robert Rich, Jr., of Rich Foods, and his 
Florida neighbor and fishing friend, Johnny Morris, the owner of 
Bass Pro.  The State created the Erie Canal Harbor Development 
Corporation to do the deal, and placed a close friend, an 
employee, and the wife of Robert Rich on the board to see it 
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through, and put large sums of NYPA money at their disposal to 
do it.cxvii 
 
NYPA should not be in the development business.  Ideally, all the 
power from the Niagara Plant would be used to provide green, 
low-cost electricity to all the residents and businesses of western 
New York.  The government would not waste inordinate 
resources picking which businesses should receive low cost 
power, and which not.  It would not send low cost power to 
some lucky customers of rural and municipal utilities while 
leaving all other residential customers to pay 50% over the 
national average.   
 
Conclusion 
New York should return to a traditional economic development 
policy focused on the delivery of public goods such as 
infrastructure, education, and the preservation of natural 
resources.  The great economic development projects of the past 
were projects such as the Erie Canal, the Land Grant Colleges, 
and the GI Bill.  Particularly in times of fiscal stress, the State 
should spend money on public goods, not private businesses.  
The notion that tax exemptions are “free money” has no support 
in the facts, but it proves irresistible to elected leaders.  In 
reality, very few tax exemptions lead to a larger economic pie 
and more tax revenue. Nearly all come at the expense of higher 
taxes for other taxpayers and cuts in vital public services and 
programs. 
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When government does offer tax incentives, it should use strict 
criteria to ensure that they go to projects that  
• Grow the state’s economy instead of simply helping one 
competitor at the expense of others; 
• Could not be done without government assistance; 
• Provide quality jobs;  
• Support communities and neighborhoods, particularly 
those in economic distress; and 
• Preserve natural resources. 
 
To accomplish these goals efficiently, New York should radically 
streamline its development programs, removing them from 
agencies like NYPA that have or should have different missions, 
and eliminating redundancies like the nine IDAs serving Buffalo 
Niagara.  Governance of economic development agencies should 
be made more accountable and democratic, and information 
about their activities should be made more accessible to the 
public. 
 
The Regional Economic Development Councils should learn from 
the State’s experience with NYPA and the IDAs as they develop 
their strategic plans, funding criteria, and recommendations for 
policy change.  New York cannot afford economic development 
programs that generate waste; now is the time to generate 
change. 
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